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1. Introduction
Land dispossession during the colonial era and the decades of apartheid rule produced a
highly unequal pattern of land ownership and widespread rural poverty in South Africa. When
a democratically elected government came to power in 1994, it adopted a land reform programme
to address the problems inherited from the past and the challenge of development in the rural
areas.
The land reform programme of the South African government is conventionally described as
having three legs: restitution, tenure reform and redistribution. While restitution deals
specifically with historical rights in land, and tenure reform with forms of land holding,
redistribution is specifically aimed at transforming the racial pattern of land ownership.
Redistribution of land is widely seen as having the potential to significantly improve the
livelihoods of the rural poor and to contribute towards economic development (Van Zyl et al.
1996; Lipton 1996; Deininger & May 2000). Nine years into the transition to democracy, however,
the underlying problems of landlessness and insecure land rights remain largely unresolved.
In line with its neo-liberal macro-economic policy, the approach of the ANC-led government to
land reform has been based on the use of free-market mechanisms, tightly controlled public
spending and minimal intervention in the economy – the so-called market-based, demand-led
approach. To date, this has made little impact on the racially skewed distribution of land in
South Africa. Agricultural land remains overwhelmingly under white ownership. Millions of
poor people continue to eke out an existence from agriculture and other land-based activities
in overcrowded and often degraded environments in the former homelands. The needs of the
rural poor continue to be seen by government largely in welfare terms, but it is becoming
increasingly clear that welfare alone cannot resolve the growing problems of chronic poverty
(Lahiff 2003).
The government’s redistribution policy has undergone a number of shifts since 1994. From
1995 to 1999, it was implemented largely by means of the Settlement/Land Acquisition Grant
(SLAG), which provided a modest grant to poor people, usually in groups, to purchase land on
the open market. In August 2001 the Department of Land Affairs (DLA) launched a revised
programme, Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD). LRAD has been promoted
by the DLA as the flagship programme through which it will pursue the objectives of land
redistribution. The broad aim of the programme is to provide support to black South Africans
over the age of 18 years who wish to farm on any scale, though statements from the DLA and
the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Affairs have made it clear that LRAD is primarily intended
to create a class of black commercial farmers, the so-called ‘emerging black farmers’.
This study provides an overview of the government’s land redistribution programme since
1994 and pays particular attention to the LRAD programme. It addresses two main questions:
Is LRAD changing the patterns of land ownership in South Africa?
What has been the impact of LRAD on the livelihoods of the rural poor?
The study draws heavily on existing reports and reviews, including unpublished material.
These are complemented by interviews with staff of national, provincial and district offices of
the DLA, as well as representatives of local government, non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) and private sector institutions involved in various aspects of land reform. While mainly
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presenting a national overview, this study draws on information from the Western Cape, Eastern
Cape and KwaZulu-Natal provinces. Between them, these provinces represent much of the
range of conditions prevailing in the country. Project-level information from these provinces is
also used to illustrate particular aspects of the programme and how it has been implemented
under varying conditions.
2. Redistribution policy
Land redistribution forms one part of the government’s land reform programme, alongside
restitution and tenure reform. All three aspects of the land reform programme are ultimately
derived from the Constitution of South Africa. Section 25(5) of the Constitution states:
The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources,
to foster conditions which enable citizens to gain access to land on an equitable basis (RSA
1996).
Access to land is one of the socio-economic rights set out in the Bill of Rights, but nowhere is
it stated that everyone has the right to land. Lahiff and Rugege (2002) argue that in meeting its
constitutional obligation, the state may choose to redistribute state land, purchase or
expropriate privately-owned land for redistribution, or make it possible for people to purchase
land by means of subsidies and through facilitating access to credit on favourable terms.
Sections 25(1), (2), (3) and (4) of the Constitution serve to protect property against arbitrary
action by the state and stress the requirement of legality and due process in dealings between
the state and property owners. At the same time, the Constitution makes it clear that the
right to property is not absolute. Property may not only be subject to restriction or regulation
by the state but may be expropriated ‘for a public purpose or in the public interest’, subject to
just and equitable compensation. The public interest is clearly stated to include land reform.
The specific objectives and approach of the redistribution policy are set out in the 1997
White Paper on South African Land Policy:
The purpose of the land redistribution programme is to provide the poor with access to land for
residential and productive uses, in order to improve their income and quality of life. The
programme aims to assist the poor, labour tenants, farm workers, women, as well as emergent
farmers. Redistributive land reform will be largely based on willing-buyer willing-seller
arrangements. Government will assist in the purchase of land, but will in general not be the
buyer or owner. Rather, it will make land acquisition grants available and will support and
finance the required planning process. In many cases, communities are expected to pool their
resources to negotiate, buy and jointly hold land under a formal title deed. Opportunities are
also offered for individuals to access the grant for land acquisition (DLA 1997b:38).
Further legal basis for redistribution is provided by the Provision of Certain Land for Settlement
Act 126 of 1993, amended in 1998 and now entitled the Provision of Land and Assistance Act
126 of 1993 (known as Act 126). Whereas the original Act allowed for the granting of an advance
or subsidy ‘to any person’, the 1998 amendment specified the categories of persons that could
be assisted. These included ‘persons who have no land or who have limited access to land,
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and who wish to gain access to land or to additional land’, persons wishing to upgrade their
land tenure, or persons who have been dispossessed of their right in land but do not have a
right to restitution under the Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994. The various grants
that have been established in terms of Act 126 and are currently available are summarised in
Table 1.
Table 1: Land reform grants in terms of Act 126
Product Level of grant Beneficiary Programme
SLAG R16 000 Households Redistribution
Tenure reform
LRAD R20 000 to R100 000 Individuals Redistribution
depending on amount of
own contribution*
LRAD Planning Grant Maximum of 15% of Individuals (or groups in Redistribution
anticipated project costs projects where LRAD
grants will be pooled)
Settlement Planning Grant Maximum of 9% of SLAG beneficiary Restitution
anticipated project costs households or groups Redistribution
Tenure reform
Commonage Grant Unspecified Municipalities Redistribution (municipal
commonage)
Land Development Unspecified Municipalities Restitution
Objectives Planning Grant Redistribution
Tenure reform
Restitution Discretionary Maximum of R3 000 Claimants (individuals Restitution
Grant or groups)
Source: DLA 2002d
* For an explanation of ‘own contribution’, see page 4
The methods chosen by the state to bring about redistribution are largely, although not entirely,
based on the operation of the existing land market through various assisted purchase measures.
Beneficiaries of the redistribution programme are not generally provided with land by the state.
Rather, the state assists people who might otherwise be unable to enter the land market to
purchase property of their own – the so-called willing buyers. This strategy presupposes that
the existing land market can deal effectively with what might be expected to be a very substantial
transfer of land, and that the intended beneficiaries, even with state assistance, will be able
to engage effectively in the market. The programme is heavily dependent on the voluntary sale
of land by current owners – the so-called willing sellers.
Until late 1999, the redistribution programme was based largely on the provision of SLAG,
a grant of R16 000 made available to qualifying households. Most projects under this programme
involved groups of applicants pooling their grants to buy formerly white-owned farms for
commercial agricultural purposes. Less commonly, groups of farm workers have used the grant
to purchase equity shares in existing farming enterprises. A separate grant for the acquisition
of municipal commonage has been made available to municipalities wishing to provide communal
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land for use (typically grazing) by inhabitants of smaller rural towns. Various other grants and
services have also been made available to participants in the redistribution programme (see
Table 1).
Following the general election of 1999, the new Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs
announced a sweeping review of land reform policy and programmes, including a moratorium
on new redistribution projects. In February 2000 the minister released a policy statement
concerning strategic directions on land issues (MALA 2000). This identified some of the problems
being faced by the DLA in implementing land reform and outlined the general policy direction
that would be followed in future. Particular attention was given to the redistribution policy.
The Policy statement lists a number of ‘severe limitations’ in the structure and implementation
of SLAG, including over-reliance on market forces, payment of inflated prices for marginal
land, lack of any significant contribution to the development of semi-commercial and commercial
black farmers, and limited impact on rural employment or transformation of agricultural land
holdings. To address these and other problems, the minister proposed a revised redistribution
programme that would include grants for aspiring commercial farmers, food safety net grants
for the rural poor, settlement grants for both urban and rural poor to access land for settlement,
and a revised commonage grant that would be available to both municipalities and tribal
authorities. The Policy statement also lifted the moratorium on new redistribution projects that
had been imposed six months before (MALA 2000).
The minister’s Policy statement was followed by a lengthy period of review and debate, and it
was not until June 2001 that a definitive new redistribution policy was unveiled, entitled Land
redistribution for agricultural development: A sub-programme of the land redistribution programme
(MALA 2001a). The official launch of the new programme (generally referred to as LRAD) took
place in August 2001.
The four types of projects that can be supported under LRAD are:
food safety net projects: agricultural production primarily for subsistence purposes
share equity schemes: purchase of shares in established commercial agricultural
enterprises
commercial agricultural production: agricultural production primarily for the market
agriculture in communal areas: existing subsistence or commercial production in the
former homelands (MALA 2001a).
The key mechanism offered by LRAD is a grant system that beneficiaries can access along a
sliding scale from R20 000 to R100 000. All beneficiaries are required to make a contribution,
in cash or in kind, the size of which will determine the value of the grant for which they
qualify. The minimum ‘own contribution’ is R5 000, with which an applicant can obtain a grant
of R20 000, while a maximum grant of R100 000 is available to those who are able to contribute
R400 000 or more. At the bottom end of the scale, the R5 000 minimum contribution can be
made in the form of ‘sweat equity’ (labour), ostensibly to ensure that poor people can participate
in the programme. Policy also allows for LRAD beneficiaries to ‘trade up’, or graduate, from one
grant level to another. Grants may be accumulated until the ceiling of R100 000 (the maximum
level of the grant) has been reached. LRAD has largely, but not entirely, replaced SLAG, which
continues to be used for certain limited purposes.
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The LRAD programme differs from SLAG in a number of important respects. Firstly, by making
grants available to individuals rather than to households, it substantially increases the level of
grant funding obtainable, since each adult in a household can apply. Under LRAD, a typical
poor black household with three adults would, in theory, be able to obtain three grants of R20
000 each (a total of R60 000) rather than one grant of R16 000 under SLAG. Secondly, the
approval and implementation of projects have been decentralised to provincial and district
level, and closer cooperation is expected between various government departments and spheres
of government, with an enhanced role for district municipalities and provincial departments of
agriculture. Despite these changes, considerable continuities with past policies are also evident.
The programme continues to be described as demand-led, meaning that beneficiaries themselves
must define the type of project in which they wish to engage and must identify their own land.
Acquisition of land, from either private or public sources, continues to be on the basis of the
willing-buyer, willing-seller approach.
LRAD grants can be used for the outright purchase of freehold land or for leasing land with
an option to purchase, as long as such land will be used at least partially for agricultural
purposes. It can also be used to contribute towards investments in land. People living in
communal areas, with secure access to agricultural land, can apply for the grant to make
productive investments in their land, such as the development of infrastructure or land
improvements.
All projects approved under LRAD must meet certain eligibility criteria. The approval of the
grants is based on the ‘viability of the proposed project, which takes into account total project
costs and project profitability’ (MALA 2001a:7). Every project application must be accompanied
by a business plan and strict commercial criteria are employed to assess the viability of these
projects.
Government employees are not currently eligible to benefit from LRAD, but a policy
amendment has been proposed to allow certain types of employees to access LRAD – presumably
rural residents and low-income categories whose engagement in agriculture does not conflict
with their employment. To promote gender equity and redress discrimination against women,
one third of all resources under LRAD are intended to go towards women (MALA 2001a:6).
LRAD is open to individuals or groups, although large groups are discouraged from applying.
Group projects require the setting up of an appropriate legal entity, such as a communal
property association (CPA), a trust or a close corporation.
LRAD is intended to make a major contribution to achieving government’s target of
transferring 30% of agricultural land – a total area of approximately 24 662 871 hectares (24.66
million hectares) – within 15 years. To achieve this target over a period of 15 years would
require an average annual transfer of 1 644 191 hectares (1.64 million hectares).1
The following section examines the achievements of LRAD, and the wider redistribution
programme, in terms of the policy objectives outlined.
3. Redistribution achievements
Achieving greater equality in land ownership and improving the livelihoods of rural people are
the main challenges facing land redistribution in South Africa. In this section we assess the
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contribution the redistribution programme, and specifically LRAD, is making to transforming
the racially-based pattern of land ownership and developing the rural economy. Before proceeding
to a critical and holistic analysis of quantitative and qualitative information, trends in land
delivery over time and across provinces are examined, along with trends in budget allocations
and expenditure. It should be noted that since the start of the land reform process, the DLA
has reported largely on the quantitative targets and achievements of land redistribution, such
as hectares of land transferred, number of projects, number of beneficiaries and the like.
Land transferred
Following a slow start, redistribution of land has accelerated considerably in recent years (see
Table 2). According to the DLA, 1.4 million hectares have been transferred to 130 000
beneficiaries from the start of the programme in 1994 to 31 December 2002. It should be noted
that most statistics published by the DLA for the period since 1994 lump together all land
transfers that occur under the various sub-programmes of redistribution (e.g. LRAD, settlement,
municipal commonage) along with land transferred under the farm dwellers’ tenure reform
programme.
Table 2: Land redistribution per year, 1994–2002
Year Total hectares Total beneficiaries
1994 71 656 1 004
1995 11 629 1 819
1996 60 120 5 068
1997 139 849 10 259
1998 229 009 15 995
1999 239 764 24 900
2000 233 426 34 768
2001 263 071 20 920
2002 203 567 12 216
Unspecified 28 743 3 504
Total 1 480 834 130 453
Source: DLA 2003
Great unevenness is found across provinces in terms of the amount of land transferred, as
shown in Figure 1, as well as in the number of projects approved and the number of beneficiaries.
The province with the most land transferred is the Northern Cape, where large areas of semi-
arid grazing land have been transferred, mainly through the municipal commonage programme.
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Figure 1: Land redistribution by province (hectares transferred), 1994–2002











Table 3: LRAD projects and hectares, December 2002
Province Land reform office Land Bank Total hectares
Projects Hectares Projects Hectares
Eastern Cape 129 51 632 * * 51 632
Free State 149 39 231 * * 39 231
Gauteng 16 583 18 701 1 284
KwaZulu-Natal 13 21 143 27 11 171 32 314
Limpopo 10 26 221 * * 26 221
Mpumalanga 36 11 882 38 32 326 44 209
Northern Cape 23 15 369 3 13 207 28 576
North West 10 30 645 * * 30 645
Western Cape 29 11 858 3 1 710 13 568




Looking specifically at LRAD, Table 3 presents the provincial breakdown of the LRAD projects
approved until 31 December 2002 (DLA 2003). From August 2001 to 30 June 2002, 125 000
hectares were transferred through LRAD. During the six months from July 2002 to December
2002, a further 140 000 hectares were redistributed, indicating an accelerated delivery of land.
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There is wide variation in the amount of land transferred under LRAD across the provinces,
ranging from 51 600 hectares in the Eastern Cape to 1 284 hectares in Gauteng. Half of all the
land transferred was in just three provinces: Eastern Cape, Free State and Mpumalanga. More
than half of all LRAD projects were in the Eastern Cape and Free State.
The figures in Table 3 show a breakdown of the number of projects processed directly by the
land reform offices of the DLA and those processed by the Land Bank. To date, most LRAD
projects (approximately 80%) have been processed directly by DLA offices. However, delivery by
the Land Bank would appear to have accelerated in recent months. This is particularly the
case in KwaZulu-Natal and Mpumalanga, where the majority of LRAD projects have been
processed through the Land Bank.
Budgets and spending
The total budget for the DLA has gradually increased since 1994, reaching R1.9 billion for the
2005/06 financial period (see Figure 2). This is less than 0.5% of the total national budget. The
land restitution programme and the land reform programme (comprising redistribution and
tenure reform) together consume over 70% of the DLA budget.
Source: National Treasury 2003
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Since the start of the land reform programme, underspending has been a prominent feature in
the financial reports of the DLA. In recent years the gap between budgets and actual expenditure
has narrowed considerably (see Table 4). In the 2001/02 financial year, underspending by the
DLA appeared to be down to about 6% of the budget, or R63.8 million (DLA 2002a:89). By the
end of 2002 the DLA’s provincial land reform offices (PLROs) were reporting that their budgets
for 2002/03 were already over-committed (Kenyon, pers. comm.; Fife, pers. comm.). Another
important trend has been the increase in capital spending as a percentage of land reform
spending, from 47% in 1997 to about 77% in 2002. Grant payments to land reform beneficiaries
also increased noticeably following the lifting of the ministerial moratorium in 2000.
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Table 4: Land reform budgets and expenditure (R million), 1996–1998 and 2000–2002
1996/97 1997/98 2000/01 2001/02
DLA budget allocation 907.6 661.1 920.6 1 040
DLA actual expenditure 276.6 425.6 768.2 976.2
Spending as % of budget 31% 64% 83% 94%
Land reform budget 791.5 538.6 355.2 505.8
Land reform actual expenditure 167.5 314.9 265.1 443.5
Land reform capital budgets 635.3 400.4 244.4 392.4
Land reform capital expenditure 79.1 195.5 156.6 341.2
Sources: DLA 1997a; DLA 2002a; National Treasury 2001; National Treasury 2003
Projected delivery
The DLA’s medium-term targets, as outlined in the 2002–2006 strategic and operational plan,
anticipate that land redistribution will occur mainly through LRAD. Anticipated land transfers
through the redistribution programme for the period 2002–2006 are shown in Table 5 (DLA
2002b). Over this period, the contribution of LRAD to the wider redistribution programme is
expected to rise from around 60% of land delivered in the first three years to 71% in the fourth
and final year of the strategic plan. For the redistribution programme as a whole, so-called
marginalised groups – women, youth and the disabled – are expected to receive between 6.4%
and 7.5% of all land transferred. This is clearly out of line with the commitment in the LRAD
policy document to ensure that women receive ‘not less than one third of the transferred land
resources’ (MALA 2001a:6).
Table 5: Redistribution targets (hectares), 2002–2006
DLA Medium-term strategic and operational plan
Indicator Targets
2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06
LRAD: hectares transferred 112 873 98 765 114 550 129 240
LRAD: hectares transferred to marginalised groups 7 739 7 157 7 666 7 992
Settlement: hectares transferred 38 843 20 458 23 930 17 185
Settlement: hectares transferred to marginalised 4 940 2 450 2 915 2 808
groups
Other redistribution: hectares transferred 29 064 43 863 45 583 33 610
Other redistribution: hectares transferred to 1 970 1 815 2 000 2 080
marginalised groups
Total 195 429 174 508 196 644 192 915
% to LRAD 61.7% 60.7% 62.2% 71.1%
% to marginalised groups (all redistribution) 7.5% 6.5% 6.4% 6.7%
Source: DLA 2002b
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The DLA’s budget for redistribution is set to decline by about 5% between 2002 and 2006 (see
Table 6). LRAD will be receiving the lion’s share of this budget, 45% on average over the
medium-term time frame. The decline in funds to LRAD over the period is less severe than the
decline in funds allocated to categories such as ‘Settlement’ and ‘Other redistribution’. Funds
specifically dedicated to marginalised groups are set to rise over the period, varying between
11% and 13% of the redistribution budget per year.
Table 6: Redistribution targets and budgets, 2002–2006
DLA Medium-term strategic and operational plan
Output Budget
2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06
R ’000 R ’000 R ’000 R ’000
Implementation of LRAD (non-loan 118 000 102 000 108 000 114 000
component)
Implementation of LRAD (loan component 18 477 18 000 20 000 16 000
projects with Land Bank)
Acquisition of land for settlement 60 000 40 000 50 000 48 000
Other redistribution projects (commonages, 26 000 22 000 22 000 23 000
equities and 126 other projects)
Land delivered to marginalised groups 27 000 25 000 32 000 29 000
Acquisition of land in support of the urban 8 000 9 000 11 000 14 000
renewal programme
Total budget for redistribution 257 477 216 000 243 000 244 000
Proportion of budget allocated to LRAD 45.8% 47.2% 44.4% 46.7%
Proportion of budget allocated to 10.5% 11.6% 13.2% 11.9%
marginalised groups
Source: DLA 2002b
Since 2002, DLA offices throughout the country have been committing funds to redistribution
in excess of their available budgets. In the Eastern Cape, for example, before the end of 2002
(three months before the end of the financial year), the PLRO had already committed itself to
expenditure of R45.7 million against an available budget for the year of just R44 million (Eastern
Cape Land Reform Office 2002). In the Western Cape the DLA had accumulated LRAD
commitments worth R102 million, of which only R48 million was available from current budgets
(Western Cape Land Reform Office 2003). Over-commitment of funds in 2002 and 2003 forced
the Western Cape Land Reform Office to cease processing new LRAD applications.
The information outlined here shows that LRAD now accounts for the bulk of the land
transfers within the redistribution programme, while other sub-programmes are stagnating.
Overall land redistribution must accelerate greatly, however, in order to meet the government’s
land reform targets. Budgets are clearly inadequate to sustain even the current rate of delivery.
The following section looks in more detail at the implementation of LRAD at national, provincial
and project levels.
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4. The implementation of LRAD
Delivery of land through LRAD has improved steadily in the period between the launch of the
programme in August 2001 and December 2002. Variations in performance across provinces
reflect differences in conditions and in the ways in which the programme is being
operationalised.
The DLA, through its PLROs, is the lead agency responsible for the processing of grants,
although applicants can also enter the LRAD programme through provincial departments of
agriculture, the Land Bank, Khula Enterprises (a parastatal development finance institution)
and Ithala Bank (a development finance corporation in KwaZulu-Natal).
Who benefits from LRAD?
LRAD aims to assist a wide range of previously disadvantaged South Africans to acquire land,
particularly people wishing to engage in commercial agriculture. Given the wide diversity of
grant levels available, it is important to establish the distribution of grants along LRAD’s
‘sliding scale’ (see page 4). This mechanism allows beneficiaries to access grants along a
sliding scale from R20 000 to R100 000. The limited evidence that is available suggests that
grants are being made all along the scale, but mostly in the range of R20 000 to R40 000. The
evidence also shows that the distribution of grants along the scale differs considerably between
provinces and between projects processed through the DLA and those processed through the
Land Bank. Important differences are also emerging between provinces with regard to both the
land areas of projects and the number of beneficiaries involved.
Information maintained by the DLA on the implementation of LRAD does not include detailed
data on beneficiaries and it is therefore not possible to establish with any certainty the
characteristics of those benefiting from the programme. The DLA’s implementation directorate
suggested that poorer applicants are being prioritised under LRAD by means of the ratio 5:3:2,
whereby 50% of resources (land and capital budgets) go towards the poor, 30% to a ‘middle
category’ and 20% to individuals accessing the grant at the upper-end of the scale (Moroka,
pers. comm.). While frequent reference was made to this formula within DLA circles, the
distinction between the three categories remains vague, and it would appear that only in the
Western Cape has any systematic effort been made to allocate funds along such lines.
According to the project list supplied by the Western Cape Land Reform Office, 57 projects
had been approved by the provincial grants approval committee by the end of 2002. Information
in this project list is summarised in Table 7.2 Clear trends are discernable in terms of types of
projects approved and land delivery.
There were 27 approved projects where beneficiaries made an own contribution of R5 000
(the bottom category) and these accounted for approximately 60% of all beneficiaries.
Beneficiaries made contributions of R100 000 and more (the top category) in six approved
projects. The remaining 19 projects (the middle category) involved less than 25% of all
beneficiaries. Grant commitments and actual grant expenditure were spread mainly across
groups in the bottom and middle categories, constituting 90% of all financial resources.
Projects involving Land Bank loans were spread across all categories. Almost all projects in
the top category applied for loans from the Land Bank while only a third in the bottom category
and one quarter in the middle category applied.
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A comparison of the three categories shows that there is an increase at the top end of the
scale in the average number of hectares per beneficiary and the average number of hectares
per project. Per capita land transferred to beneficiaries and projects in the top category was in
the order of 88 hectares, compared to 15 hectares transferred to those in the middle category
and 3 hectares distributed to those in the bottom category. Overall, smaller groups with more
resources and with access to Land Bank loans are acquiring more land per beneficiary as well
as larger farming units.
In the Eastern Cape the majority of projects approved (approximately 70%) consisted of
small groups not exceeding ten beneficiaries each, while only 6% of groups comprised 30 or more
participants (see Table 8). Although projects with less members tend to have less land than
those with more members, per capita land holding in the smaller groups is substantially higher –
72.8 hectares per person for groups with ten members or less as compared to 15.1 hectares per
person in groups with more than 30 members. It may therefore be concluded that LRAD, in the
Eastern Cape at least, is focusing on creating relatively smaller projects in terms of the number
of members per project and the overall land area, but with substantial land per project member.
Own contributions can be in the form of sweat equity (or labour), assets (including livestock),
cash, loans or a combination of these. The most common form of asset contribution among
applicants is livestock, and livestock valuation practices differ widely across provinces and
across institutions. According to Land Bank officials in KwaZulu-Natal, for example, only branded
livestock will be accepted when computing the value of an applicant’s own contribution.
While it may be assumed that most applicants at the bottom end of the scale are citing
sweat equity as their own contribution, this could not be confirmed; nor is it clear whether
better-off applicants are including sweat equity as part of their own contribution. In Limpopo,
for example, only two projects out of 20 processed by the PLRO included labour as part of own
contributions, while 19 out of 21 projects processed through the Land Bank included labour as
part of own contributions.
Table 7: Summary statistics: Western Cape LRAD projects, December 2002
All LRAD projects R5 000 R6 000–R99 000 R100 000+
(own contribution) (own contribution) (own contribution)
Approved projects 57 27 19 6
Transferred projects 14 11 3 0
Individual participants 3 870 2 432 928 67
Land (hectares) 28 971 8 246 13 844 5 927
Grant commitment 100 405 533 58 455 041 29 772 777 2 393 767
Expenditure to date 48 362 835 27 126 547 19 560 159 502 950
Average hectares/ 7.49 3.39 14.92 88.46
person
Average hectares/ 508.26 305.41 728.63 987.81
project
Land Bank projects 19 9 5 5
Source: Western Cape Land Reform Office 2003
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Under LRAD, there has been a distinct shift from large group sizes to small group sizes, and
even to individual (one-person) projects, a trend facilitated by the availability of much larger
grants than hitherto. Smaller group sizes are actively encouraged by the DLA, as illustrated in
the example of the Delindlala land redistribution project in the Eastern Cape (see Box 1).
Technicist project viability criteria (profitability ratios, debt-equity ratios and poverty
assessments) and stereotypes of group dynamics are often used to argue against larger group
projects. In some provinces an arbitrary poverty datum line is used to determine the viability
of a project, requiring that it generates an income of at least R25 000 per annum or R2 000 per
month per person. This implies that a project with an initial investment of R25 000 can realise
a return of 100% in the first year, which is highly unrealistic.
Table 8: Eastern Cape LRAD projects approved and transferred, October 2002
Beneficiaries per project Total
1–10 11–20 21–30 30+
Grants 400 274 315 389 1 378
Percentage 29 20 23 28 100
Projects 90 17 12 8 127
Percentage 71 13 10 6 100
Land (hectares) 29 133 8 350 8 157 5 893 51 533
Percentage 57 16 16 11 100
Average hectares/person 72.8 30.5 25.9 15.1 36.1
Average hectares/project 323.7 491.2 679.8 736.6 405.8
Source: Eastern Cape Land Reform Office 2002
Box 1: Limiting group size? The case of Delindlala
One of the most controversial aspects in land redistribution is group projects. Delindlala, a land redistribution
project in the Queenstown district in the Eastern Cape, illustrates how the DLA has attempted to limit the size
of group projects.
The group currently farming at Delindlala engaged in communal gardening at Luphaphasi, a village in the
Xalanga district of the former Transkei homeland where scarcity of land, especially grazing land, and poverty
prevail. When 60 community members from Luphaphasi and Cala Reserve constituted themselves as a group
and approached the DLA for the LRAD grant, the DLA dropped the 30 applicants from Cala Reserve from the
list.
The reasons offered by the DLA for limiting the group size included:
The farm could not generate enough income to sustain 60 people, based on a R25 000 per annum
poverty line for each person.
There was a need to curb the ‘rent-a-crowd’ phenomenon.
The DLA, with its strong support for individual and small group projects, argued that maintaining group
cohesion and ensuring the productive use of the farm are critical challenges facing this project. The DLA
succeeded in limiting the total grant paid to beneficiaries but failed to limit the group size. The result is that
there are 60 adults, all from Luphaphasi, currently farming at Delindlala, but only 40 are actual grantees.
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The previous use of the household as the primary unit of redistribution was criticised as
reinforcing existing biases against women’s independent rights to land. The shift from providing
grants to households (as was done under SLAG) to providing grants to individuals under LRAD
is an important improvement in the design of land redistribution from the standpoint of women
applicants. Women have now been included in a ‘marginalised group’ with youth, the disabled,
labour tenants and farm workers. As far as could be established, no specific measures are in
place to ensure that such groups participate and benefit from LRAD grants, and no specific
budgets are reserved for this purpose.
The LRAD grant is intended to assist not only with land purchase but also with investments
in agricultural production. Beneficiaries who had already obtained farmland through the land
reform process and who want to invest in agricultural production can also apply for the LRAD
grant. At the provincial level there is an ad hoc use of LRAD grants in the context of farm
tenure reform, while evidence is lacking when it comes to restitution.3
Occupants of communal land (particularly in the former homelands) are, in theory, entitled
to apply for LRAD grants for investment purposes. In practice, however, there is considerable
confusion around this matter, particularly in terms of the provision of grants where no land
purchase is involved and the use of land held under communal or informal tenure as either
own contribution or as collateral for Land Bank loans.
Provinces that include the former homeland areas appear to have made little progress with
developing implementation procedures in this regard. The operationalisation of this aspect of
LRAD appears to be on hold pending the legal reform of communal tenure. The one exception
is KwaZulu-Natal, where LRAD grants are being made available to individuals who live on
Ingonyama Trust land and are in possession of a ten-year lease agreement.
Access to land
The LRAD grant is primarily intended to assist applicants to acquire farmland. While the
policy promotes the acquisition of privately-owned commercial agricultural land, other sources
of land, such as state land and land repossessed by the Land Bank, are not precluded. The
state does not generally acquire land on behalf of applicants or take steps to ensure that land
is available in areas or in quantities that suit applicants. Rather, the DLA restricts its activities
to providing grants and information about land available on the market. In many cases, land of
suitable size, quality and price is not available in close proximity to where applicants reside.
While supply of land depends heavily on the willingness of private owners to make land available
for sale to land reform beneficiaries, anecdotal evidence suggests that many landowners are
not willing to do so and that others have been deterred by the lengthy and bureaucratic process
involved. This section looks at the availability of land for redistribution and the manner in
which beneficiaries are accessing it under the LRAD programme.
Whether LRAD beneficiaries buy private land or acquire state-owned land, the price is
usually market-related. Supply of land on the market, however, is affected by a combination of
economic and political factors. Economic factors can include land speculation, changes in land
use, conditions in product markets, the indebtedness of the sellers and interest rates. Land
ownership in South Africa has been, and continues to be, highly segmented along racial lines
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and therefore highly politicised. A decision to sell land, and at what price, may be based on
collusion among neighbouring farmers to keep black farmers out of a certain area. Similarly, a
decision to offer state land to land reform beneficiaries before putting it on the open market is
essentially a political decision.
Potentially important sources of agricultural land for land reform are the properties that
come into the possession of the state-owned Land Bank in the course of its business. Since
2001, the Land Bank and the DLA have had an agency agreement whereby repossessed properties
are first offered to the DLA to meet the demands of the redistribution programme. This is now
standard practice in the Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal, although officials could not provide
estimates of the number and value of properties actually transferred. According to Land Bank
officials in KwaZulu-Natal, the quality of repossessed land is generally poor, and the Bank
often ends up referring LRAD applicants to real estate agents to acquire land on the open
market.
LRAD beneficiaries can also use their grants to acquire state and parastatal agricultural
land that is being sold off. Information regarding the sale and location of this land must,
according to DLA policy, be made publicly available and potential beneficiaries have a period of
three months in which to secure the necessary grant (MALA 2001a:12). Since 2000, the Minister
of Land Affairs has prioritised state land disposal as a means to make land available for
redistribution, and has indicated that 669 000 hectares of land will be disposed of in favour of
land reform beneficiaries (MALA 2001b) (see Table 9). This is supported by provincial state
land disposal committees (PSLDCs) which bring together representatives of various government
departments and spheres of government (DLA 2002c).
The DLA’s Public Land Support Services (PLSS) unit has developed an online database of
public land. However, the database is not accessible to the public. According to one source in
the DLA, this is because elements within the state fear that if the general public were to know
which land belongs to the state, the land would be targeted for illegal occupation. The PLSS
has, however, confirmed that approximately 24 million hectares of land is owned by the state
(Slabbert, pers. comm.).
There are essentially two types of state land disposal under LRAD:
a) Beneficial occupation: Title is transferred to persons already in occupation of the land.
Under these circumstances, the value of the land is not deducted from the grant.
b) No beneficial occupation: Through an accounting entry, the value of the land is deducted
from the grant (which reverts back to the state) (Mngengwe, pers. comm.).
In 2002 the national Department of Agriculture reported that just over half of the targeted
land had been disposed of and that only 11.8% of this land had gone to LRAD beneficiaries
(see Table 9). Officials in the Western Cape Department of Agriculture, however, contested
the accuracy of these figures, suggesting that no state land had been available for disposal in
the province, and that none had gone to LRAD beneficiaries (Isaacs, pers. comm.).
Given the large average size of commercial farms, there is a pressing need to subdivide
existing holdings in order to ensure that smaller parcels of land become available to meet the
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needs of resource-poor people who may not be able to afford large commercial farms. Without
effective measures to facilitate the subdivision of agricultural land – ideally prior to it being
offered to land reform beneficiaries – the sizes of existing land parcels could severely limit the
progress of reform and perpetuate the pattern of large group projects experienced under
redistribution to date.
In response to this challenge, the minister has announced the intention to repeal the
Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970. Meanwhile, the minister’s approval is required
for any subdivision of land barring those projects transferred under Act 126, which specifically
provides that, on approval, projects involving subdivision are exempted from requiring
permission (MALA 2001a:13). This provision alone, however, may not be sufficient to overcome
the major practical and financial difficulties associated with subdivision of land.
The DLA has anticipated that easing restrictions on land subdivision would create incentives
for existing landowners to subdivide their land for sale prior to selling it to LRAD applicants.
It was also anticipated that developers might buy farms and then subdivide them, invest in
improved infrastructure, and sell off individual units to LRAD beneficiaries at a profit. No
evidence could be found that either landowners or speculators are doing this on any significant
scale. Where this has occurred, it would appear to be driven by philanthropic or empowerment
motives rather than by profit.
In KwaZulu-Natal and Mpumalanga, for example, two sugar companies, Tongaat-Hullet and
Illovo, have subdivided many of their large sugar estates for sale to LRAD beneficiaries. This
process of divestment preceded the launch of LRAD and is part of a drive by sugar companies
to withdraw from agricultural production and concentrate on processing operations (Van den
Heever, pers. comm.). Potential beneficiaries had their applications processed through Ithala
Bank, which also made loan financing available. Illovo appointed an extension officer and all
Table 9: State land targeted and disposed of (hectares), March 2002
Province Land targeted Disposal until LRAD disposal LRAD as % of all
March 2002 land disposed of
Limpopo 270 777 128 180 10 367 8%
North West 36 459 43 778 N/A N/A
Western Cape 17 380 3 860 3 508 91%
KwaZulu-Natal 48 472 36 610 N/A N/A
Northern Cape 49 931 50 824 13 272 26%
Eastern Cape 161 363 50 283 N/A N/A
Mpumalanga 27 853 15 060 N/A N/A
Free State 36 364 67 498 18 995 28%
Gauteng 20 401 N/A N/A N/A
Total 669 000 396 093 46 142 11%
Source: NDA 2002a
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the beneficiaries went through a six-month training programme prior to settling on the land.
Outside of such contract farming arrangements, however, there is no evidence that subdivision
is taking place on a significant scale or that land is becoming available to poorer farmers on a
scale which they can afford.
Box 2: Land availability through land markets
In recent land sales, land prices have been much higher than previously paid. As the land reform programme
slowly picks up momentum, land is going to be overpriced (Shabane, pers. comm.).
Trends in private land offered for redistribution vary across provinces, although DLA and Land Bank officials
claim that after the introduction of LRAD more farmers were willing to sell their land than before. Commercial
farming units are usually offered for sale in their entirety, and subdivision is rare due to the high transaction
costs associated with it. Almost invariably, officials have assumed that LRAD beneficiaries will continue with
the land-use practices of the former landowners.
According to Eastern Cape officials, during the late 1990s the depressed agricultural sector in that province
ignited a crisis in the land market and a collapse in land prices. Some landowners who snatched up land at
depressed prices at the time now want to capitalise on the opportunities presented by LRAD. The extent to
which this specific land is being offered for redistribution through LRAD and its impact on the market could not
be concretely verified.
Reports by provincial DLA officials, confirmed by some NGOs, indicate that high quality land has been
offered for sale for redistribution purposes in Mpumalanga, KwaZulu-Natal and Western Cape. In KwaZulu-
Natal, the Cane Growers’ Association and the Natal Banana Growers’ Association remain proactive in
making land available. DLA land reform offices in the South Coast and Tugela districts of KwaZulu-Natal have
been inundated with offers from private farmers to sell land. Many of these opportunities have been missed
due to bureaucratic delays in the provincial land reform office, insufficient budgets, lack of staff and the
absence of mechanisms to match sellers with potential buyers.
Project design and approval
LRAD projects undergo a complex project planning cycle before they are implemented. This
process starts with the submission of a completed application and ends with the transfer of a
land title, although some post-transfer activities are now being incorporated into the project
cycle. Across the country, it can take between three and eighteen months before the land title
is transferred. DLA’s decentralisation campaign is aimed at reducing the LRAD project cycle to
an average of three months, and in one province – the Eastern Cape – an even more ambitious
target of six weeks has been set (Kenyon, pers. comm.; Sukula, pers. comm.).
A number of different agencies can initiate, design and implement LRAD projects. However,
all applications must eventually come before the PGAC. This section examines the project
approval process, focusing on the institutions involved and the impact these are having on
land delivery.
Implementation of LRAD is generally divided into two phases, namely the transfer of land
titles, which is the responsibility of the DLA, and post-transfer support, which is the
responsibility of provincial departments of agriculture (PDoAs). These two phases have been
perceived by many government officials as quite distinct, resulting in poor integration of the
efforts of the two departments. Efforts to integrate the two phases have progressed more in
some provinces than in others, particularly where the PDoA has also become involved in the
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processing of LRAD applications. Elsewhere, PDoAs are limited to verifying business plans
and valuations submitted to them by the DLA, and sitting on district screening committees
(DSCs) or district assessment committees (DACs).
In order to access redistribution grants, applicants are required to conclude provisional
agreements of sale with sellers and to develop business plans regarding the use to which the
land will be put. These business plans must include a project proposal (a land-use proposal or
farm plan), a provisional agreement of sale, confirmation from a professional land valuer that
the land price is reasonable, a list of beneficiaries and their contributions and evidence of the
availability of these contributions (an audit and valuation of assets or draft loan agreement).
In addition, the business plan must include a feasibility report from a local agricultural officer
regarding both agricultural feasibility and environmental impact. This officer must also confirm
that the seller is in legal possession of title to the land.
Entry points most frequently used by LRAD applicants remain the DLA’s provincial land
reform offices. These offices disburse the LRAD grants and also recommend possible service
providers to applicants. For each LRAD application that comes through the PLRO, a DLA project
planner is appointed to develop the application into a viable project proposal or to manage
outside service providers or consultants. Project planners usually work with beneficiaries
until the transfer of the land title, although some of them conduct return visits to projects
during the post-transfer phase.
PLRO and PDoA officials in the Western Cape confirmed that these two agencies collaborate
during the project design and approval phase. This cooperation is aimed at improving the
sustainability of land reform projects as well as incorporating post-transfer intervention
planning, the specific job of the PDoA, during the project design phase. Until the end of 2002,
separate evaluation reports from different directorates within the PDoA were submitted to the
DACs. These reports often contradicted each other and caused delays in project approvals.
The Western Cape PDoA has now streamlined its internal operations, which are coordinated
by the Farmer Settlement Support unit, and only one evaluation report for each project
application is now submitted to the DAC (Isaacs, pers. comm.). This working relationship
between the PLRO and PDoA in the province has had a positive impact on the quality of
delivery, although delivery of land continues to lag behind much of the rest of the country.
In each of its 46 district offices, the KwaZulu-Natal Department of Agriculture has a
coordinator for the LRAD programme. The coordinators represent the department in district-
level project approval forums, focusing on the environmental sustainability of farming
enterprises. An agricultural scientist working for the department is often brought in to assist
with the approval of LRAD business plans. The PDoA is also represented on the panel that
screens and selects design agents to be included in the service provider database maintained
by the DLA (Urquhart, pers. comm.).
Once project officers have completed LRAD applications, they are forwarded to DACs or
DSCs, from where an initial recommendation is forwarded to the provincial projects approval
committee (PPAC). DACs have been established throughout the country since 2001 in line
with DLA’s Project Mutingati, which is aimed at decentralising implementation.
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There is no uniform approach to the role of DACs or who should be represented on them. In
some provinces their functions and powers seem to have increased in line with the
decentralisation trend in the DLA, as is evident in KwaZulu-Natal where project Mutingati
was piloted. DACs in the Western Cape include representatives of provincial land rights offices,
the provincial department of agriculture, local government and various stakeholders in the
sector, including organised agriculture, agribusiness, small-scale farmers, NGOs and unions.
The process of establishing these DACs is still at an early stage, and civil society
organisations have pointed to a number of problems in their operation. Firstly, in some districts
where DACs have been established, the members are not fully aware of the policies they are
supposed to be implementing or the criteria to be applied in evaluating project proposals. DAC
members are not always informed of the total budget at their disposal, nor how these budgets
should be divided between different categories of beneficiaries. According to one member of a
DAC in the Western Cape, this has led to a failure to strategically prioritise applications.
Secondly, the interests of commercial farmers’ associations tend to prevail where NGO
representation is weak and where the DLA does not impose strict project assessment criteria.
In one district of the Western Cape, for example, a number of large equity share schemes have
been approved, despite their lack of clear mechanisms to benefit workers (Fortuin, pers. comm.).
An example is the Mouton Citrus (Pty) Ltd equity scheme, whereby 236 workers were allocated
R4.6 million in LRAD grants to buy a 12% (non-tradable) shareholding in the company but
which did not guarantee them any further benefits or land rights.
DLA officials acknowledge that it has been difficult for the DLA to manage DACs (Van der
Merwe, pers. comm.). Setting them up has taken time and, for many of the stakeholders, land
is not a priority issue. This raises the question of whether, or how, these committees should
be related to other district-level development interventions and planning processes. If DACs
operate in isolation, projects may not be supported by other agencies such as local government
and other government departments, and this is likely to jeopardise their sustainability.
Post-transfer support
Both the Mid-term Review (DLA 1997a) and the Review of the Land Reform Pilot Programme (DLA
1999) pointed out that post-transfer support is crucial for the overall success of land
redistribution, yet it has been neglected by virtually all the key role players. Support services,
or complementary development support, specified in the White Paper include assistance with
productive and sustainable land use, infrastructure support, farm credit, agricultural inputs
and access to markets for farm outputs (DLA 1997b:16). Compared to the earlier SLAG programme,
LRAD was intended to introduce a significant shift in the area of post-transfer support.
Currently, no specific institution has responsibility for driving and coordinating the provision
of post-transfer support to redistribution beneficiaries, and little has been forthcoming in the
area of financial resources to fund such assistance. Ad hoc arrangements persist, with an
array of institutions providing support in areas such as extension services, credit, training
and infrastructure. There is a general perception in the DLA, however, that the primary
responsibility for post-transfer support lies with PDoAs, as stipulated in LRAD policy (Kenyon,
pers. comm.).
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Provincial departments of agriculture have been restructured to incorporate Farmer Settlement
Support (FSS) units which are intended to coordinate post-transfer support to LRAD projects,
especially in the areas of agricultural extension, infrastructural support and training. FSS
units receive their budgets from provincial governments, while funding from the NDA is usually
earmarked for specific activities such as training. LRAD encourages the provision of agricultural
extension services through the private sector. The NDA has drafted a farmer support package
or ‘sunrise package’ for LRAD beneficiaries, the Comprehensive Farmer Support Programme
(or LRAD Support Programme). Two grants are proposed under this programme, one for capacity
building and one for on-farm infrastructure. Grants, allocated as capital transfers by the NDA,
are to be administered jointly by the PDoAs and the PLROs. The on-farm infrastructure grants,
ranging from a minimum of R5 000 to a maximum of R100 000, require an own contribution
from beneficiaries similar to the LRAD grant. This post-transfer programme has not, however,
been implemented to date.
Several agricultural colleges, such as Cedara in KwaZulu-Natal and Elsenburg in the Western
Cape, operated by the PDoA and the Agricultural Research Council (ARC), provide training for
land redistribution beneficiaries, but these are oriented towards commercial farming (Urquhart,
pers. comm.). Course materials do not always cater for the language needs of land reform
beneficiaries and attendance at formal instruction sessions requires an extended period away
from people’s homes. Budgets ring-fenced for training by the NDA and transferred to provinces
remain inadequate to cover minimal training costs of beneficiaries. Individuals who apply and
are admitted for training in farming must use their own resources to pay their fees.
Although training needs are identified and stipulated in business plans, actual training
only starts after land transfer, instead of at the time of preliminary project approval by the
DACs. The LRAD projects driven by the sugar industry in KwaZulu-Natal carry important lessons
in this regard. Immediately following the selection of small-scale farmers for the joint venture
projects, which occurs about six months prior to transfer, the participants are put through an
agricultural training programme. Beneficiaries are therefore well prepared for the first year,
considered the most critical phase of any agricultural project.
Additional ways to enhance the technical and management skills of LRAD beneficiaries are
mentorship and management programmes. The Land Bank offers a social discount product
which encourages neighbouring farmers to mentor new farmers in exchange for a rebate on
interest payments. In all the provinces PDoA and DLA officials said they supported mentorship
and management models, yet only the KwaZulu-Natal PDoA has developed a mentorship policy
framework. TRAC-Mpumalanga, a land rights NGO, has also developed a three-year mentorship
pilot programme for redistribution projects in the province, for which it has secured donor
funding – a rare example of NGO involvement in both land reform and agricultural support.
Budgetary and staff constraints continue to hamper PDoAs in responding to the post-transfer
needs of land reform beneficiaries. In terms of its budget, the Eastern Cape Department of
Agriculture is one of the largest in the country, but the bulk of its allocation goes towards
salaries, with little left over for capital expenditure (see Table 10). At one point, 85% of the
overall budget was being spent on staffing while extension officers went without vehicles or
petrol. While the total budget of the department is rising in nominal terms, and the bloated
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salary and wage bill is shrinking as a share of the overall budget, departmental priorities seem
to be shifting away from post-transfer assistance to LRAD beneficiaries. The decrease in
personnel spending is not paralleled by an expansion in high quality extension services and
other forms of support to beneficiaries. Allocations to the technology and development division,
consisting of extension services and farmer settlement support services, are also set to decline
as a proportion of the total budget.
Table 10 provides two different ways of looking at the PDoA’s budget. Firstly, it shows how
much of the budget is taken up by allocations to personnel. Secondly, it shows the allocations
to technology and development – which itself also includes personnel costs.
Table 10: Eastern Cape Department of Agriculture budget, 2000–2006
Year Total R ’000 Personnel Technology and development
R ’000 % of total (R ’000) % of total
2000/01 450 885 368 984 82 114 459 25
2001/02 563 296 400 136 71 127 076 22
2002/03 565 115 406 355 72 141 167 25
2003/04 735 440 444 270 60 143 980 19
2004/05 688 491 464 055 67 147 409 21
2005/06 718 201 483 007 67 149 013 21
Sources: Eastern Cape Treasury 2003; Eastern Cape Department of Agriculture 2003
Farmer settlement support services, introduced in the Eastern Cape after a substantial
restructuring of the PDoA, has been allocated R102 million in 2002/03 (70% of the technology
development and transfer budget). Allocations to LandCare, a programme promoting sustainable
natural resource use in the communal areas of the province, will decline from R10 million to
approximately R8 million this year. Provincial budget figures give no indication of the proportion
of these budgets that will be spent on redistribution beneficiaries in the form of capital transfers
or grant assistance. Overall, the prospects for emerging farmers looking to the state for support
while they struggle to become established do not look very promising.
Box 3: Infrastructure grants in KwaZulu-Natal
 The Department of Agriculture in KwaZulu-Natal is the only provincial department so far to have developed
infrastructure grants for emerging farmers. The infrastructure grant scale mirrors the LRAD grant scale and is
without any ring-fencing. Grants range from a minimum of R4 000 to a maximum of R100 000. In order to
access the grant, an applicant must make an own contribution, in either cash or labour (or a combination of
the two), ranging from R1 000 at the bottom end to R400 000 at the top end of the scale. These grants will
be available not only to LRAD beneficiaries but also to other farmers who may want to expand into niche
export markets. Although historically disadvantaged individuals will be given preference in the allocation of
funds, specific allocations for this have not been stipulated in the main policy document. Large irrigation
schemes will be developed as part of the plan to commercialise agriculture in the communal areas. Sixty
percent of the budget is earmarked for large anchor projects and 40% for bulk infrastructure and medium- to
small-scale projects. Food security and small-scale commercial projects will also be supported. Commercial
projects can either be in the form of shared bulk infrastructure projects or individual projects. Overall, the
programme aims to foster independence and self-reliance.
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Financial institutions
In 1996 the Strauss Commission investigated the constraints facing poor people in rural areas
in accessing finance to invest in land, agricultural production and other income-generating
activities. The growing realisation of the need to remove constraints to participation in rural
credit markets was one factor leading to the transformation of the Land Bank, the setting up
of new development finance institutions, and expanded lending to the poor by private banks
after 1994. In addition, many informal financial institutions, providing mainly consumption
loans, also operate in rural areas.
Sweeping changes have been made in the operation of the Land Bank since the late 1990s
following the release of the Strauss Commission Report. New legislation governing the operation
of the Bank has been passed, a new corporate identity has been unveiled and loans targeted at
the ‘financial needs of the previously disadvantaged farming community’ (Land Bank 1999)
have been introduced.
The Bank is involved in agency agreements with the DLA and the Commission for the
Restitution of Land Rights to make development finance available to land reform beneficiaries.
The agency agreement between the DLA and the Land Bank, with capital of R50 million, deals
specifically with LRAD and provides for further funding in the future.
With regard to the use of land as collateral, the Land Bank follows a conservative valuation
approach and is primarily interested in the price a property can command in the market place.
In this regard, it distinguishes between the market value and production value of the land and
uses the lesser of the two to determine how much clients can borrow. Land Bank loans are
usually limited to 80% of the production value of the land.
Khula Enterprises, a parastatal development finance institution, also administers LRAD
grants for disbursement through equity schemes. It hosts the Land Reform Credit Facility
(LRCF) which was initially capitalised with R63 million from the DLA and was later brought up
to a total of R120 million after a further disbursement in 2001. This fund was set up by the
DLA in 1999 as a revolving credit facility to leverage loans from commercial banks to finance
certain land reform projects, particularly equity schemes.
The LRCF will lend up to R400 000 per person participating in an equity scheme and up to
R600 000 in mortgage finance per person. At present, 80% of the LRCF’s projects are equity
schemes but it plans to grow its role in mortgage finance. While the Land Bank is a ‘retailer’ of
loan finance, the LRCF remains a ‘wholesaler’, but the Land Bank will be increasingly moving
towards leveraging private sector finance for land reform projects (Oricho, pers. comm.). There
is anecdotal evidence that LRAD beneficiaries have also been applying to commercial banks
for loans, specifically ABSA and Standard Bank. The main source of finance for equity schemes,
however, continues to be the DLA, since LRAD grants can be used for this purpose.
Ithala Bank is closely involved with the financing of LRAD projects in KwaZulu-Natal, having
provided loan finance to 11 out of the first 12 projects in the province. Ithala considers the
rate of return in agriculture as crucial for the success of projects and the ability to repay
farming debt. Ithala Bank projects do not target those who can only make their own contributions
in the form of sweat equity. Typically, Ithala Bank will process bigger projects: the average loan
size for its medium-scale farmer project (its loan product linked to LRAD grants) is R1.2 million.
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A critical weakness in the business plans and farm evaluations prepared by financial
institutions is that social factors are often neglected while the financial requirements of
projects are carefully assessed. Projects in which production is for household consumption
can be excluded from access to credit through the formal markets as a result of these criteria.
Other non-state actors
Many non-state institutions, ranging from a variety of private businesses to non-governmental
organisations, are involved in aspects of land redistribution. NGOs generally stress the
livelihood and developmental dimension of the redistribution process, while private sector
groups broadly concentrate on the commercial dimension. Economic and political power relations
differ among these civil society role players and engagement with policy and policy makers varies.
The role of organised agriculture
Agricultural organisations are well entrenched in South Africa’s commercial farming sector
and their membership control an overwhelming proportion of farmland and agricultural resources.
The major unions of commercial farmers are Agri South Africa (AgriSA), Transvaal Agricultural
Union (TAU) and the National African Farmers’ Union (NAFU). AgriSA is by far the largest
national formation of farmers in the country and its membership consists of predominantly
white farmers. TAU, a former AgriSA affiliate, operates in the provinces of the old Transvaal.
NAFU draws its members mainly from black commercial and ‘emerging’ farmers, both inside
and outside the former homelands.
Farmer unions have different approaches to land reform. AgriSA, for instance, strongly
supports the willing-buyer, willing-seller basis of LRAD. It also presents input on specific
projects in DSCs and its members participate in a wide range of mentorship and capacity-
building programmes. White farm owners who engage in land redistribution do so in a number
of different ways. Some offer their land for sale to beneficiaries, others provide post-transfer
support to beneficiaries as mentors or farm managers. Others engage in joint ventures by
offering a share of their enterprise to workers or emerging farmers. NAFU sees LRAD as the
chief vehicle through which its members can buy land in order to become commercial farmers.
There is regular dialogue between organised agriculture and the DLA on matters relating to
land and agrarian reform. AgriSA, NAFU and other sectoral stakeholders participate in the
national Department of Agriculture’s Agriculture Working Group where policies affecting the
sector are discussed. The Strategic Plan for South African Agriculture (NDA 2001b), which outlines
how the agricultural sector plans to engage with LRAD, came out of the collaboration between
organised commercial agriculture and government.
The private sector
All PLROs maintain a database of service providers that beneficiaries can contract to prepare
a business plan for a project. Most of these private sector service providers or ‘design agents’
are estate agents or development planners with expertise in farmland valuation and agricultural
business planning. Mechanisms to ensure good quality work by these service providers include
the DLA’s guidelines for preparing business plans and a technical evaluation of all land valuations
and farming feasibility plans by specialists working in the PDoA. Provincial land reform officials
claimed that over a period of almost two years of implementing LRAD they succeeded in
identifying efficient service providers, which has contributed to accelerated delivery.
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One example of a relatively successful and popular service provider is AgriLink II, a one-stop
service provider carrying out farm feasibility studies, land valuations and business plans, with
offices in both the Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal. AgriLink II is funded by USAID and
specialises in desktop valuations and project feasibility studies as well as developing marketing
arrangements between small-scale producers and potential buyers of their output. Services
are provided free of charge to government, and those in the DLA and Land Bank who accessed
its services praised it for its high levels of efficiency. Land reform offices, however, lack the
capacity to effectively supervise the output of private sector service providers, but a clear need
exists for an internal DLA service to proactively match land needs to available land.
Civil society and non-governmental organisations
The commercial orientation of LRAD has met with considerable criticism from NGOs working
in the land sector. Although NGOs have been marginalised from the policy formulation process,
this has not prevented them from assisting communities gaining access to LRAD grants.
Indeed, many NGOs in the land and rural development sector have become indispensable for
the success of the land reform programme.
The National Land Committee (NLC) is the main NGO network in the sector and has affiliates
in every province. Other significant civil society role players are the Mineworkers Development
Association (MDA) and the Landless Peoples Movement (LPM). The presence of the MDA in
the sector, primarily in post-transfer support initiatives, reflects the complex connections
between migrant labour and land-based livelihoods. The massive layoffs in the mining sector
have resulted in unemployed mineworkers returning to the rural areas and, consequently, in
an increase in the need for productive land and agricultural resources. The LPM, a social
movement that emerged from various local struggles for land in early 2001, has a close working
relationship with the NLC network.
Box 4: An NGO driving LRAD: Calusa’s experiment
The Cala University Students Association (Calusa), a rural development NGO based in the Eastern Cape and
affiliated to the Trust for Community Outreach and Education, has been exploring ways of using LRAD grants
to benefit the rural poor in the Eastern Cape. Calusa’s ongoing involvement in land reform includes the
following:
conducting an assessment of land uses and needs of the potential land reform beneficiaries in the Xalanga
district of Transkei
raising awareness of other redistribution projects and the reasons for their success or failure
informing rural communities about LRAD and assisting them to apply for grants
facilitating the formation and management of communal property associations (CPAs), training group
members in financial management, and introducing innovations such as the ‘cooperative labour rotating
production technique’.
Driven by their goals to improve land access, sustainable land use and livelihoods of rural people, Calusa is
plugging a crucial gap that government agencies are unable to fill, and maintains pressure on the DLA to
improve its services to the rural poor.
Source: Fani Ncapayi, pers. comm.
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During 2002, the Western Cape Land Reform Office initiated a process of stakeholder
consultation in order to develop a strategic vision and plan to accelerate land redistribution in
the province. This attempted to quantify how much land would need to be delivered in this
province in order to meet the official target of 30% of agricultural land, and how much it would
cost. NGOs in the Western Cape have welcomed this cooperation as a step in the right direction
and appear committed to engage in the implementation of this vision.
5. Conclusion
Land redistribution is intended to redress the racial imbalance in land holding in South Africa,
create livelihoods for the rural poor and develop the agricultural sector. This report, based on
national level data and illustrative examples from some provinces, demonstrates that very
limited progress has been made to date in meeting these objectives. Critical problems have
been identified in the areas of policy design, implementation and post-transfer support. While
the pace of land delivery has accelerated in the past year, it still lags far behind official targets.
Land redistribution is taking place in the context of a neo-liberal paradigm of political
economy, which curtails the role of the state and public sector in the economy and promotes
service delivery through the market. Under SLAG and, more recently, under the LRAD
programme, state assistance has been largely confined to the provision of grants in order for
beneficiaries to acquire farming land through willing-buyer, willing-seller transactions. This
policy framework has major implications for the state, in terms of budgetary requirements, for
intended beneficiaries, in terms of access to land, and for the wider process of post-apartheid
transformation, in terms of the exceedingly slow pace of reform. A narrow interpretation of
‘demand-led’ reform has deterred the state from actively pursuing market opportunities, through
a proactive land acquisition strategy, or from using its constitutional powers to expropriate land.
Reliance on the market to acquire land has been accompanied by a strong, and increasing,
emphasis on commercial agricultural production. Applications for land reform grants are required
to conform to stringent commercial criteria in order to qualify for land purchase grants and
loan financing. Applicants are increasingly expected to source support services, ranging from
business planning to extension services and finance, from the private sector. Small-scale
production, particularly for household consumption, hardly features in official redistribution
thinking, and state agricultural services are virtually unavailable in large areas of the country.
Intergovernmental coordination, particularly between the DLA and the various departments of
agriculture, remains a critical weakness in the redistribution programme, particularly in the
area of post-transfer support.
Access to LRAD funding by the very poor is increasingly in doubt. In terms of targeting,
there has been a clearly discernable shift away from the broad category of ‘rural poor’ to ill-
defined ‘marginalised groups’, including women, youth and the disabled. Between them, these
groups are intended to receive just 11% of all LRAD resources. However, no specific measures
are in place in most provinces to give effect to this and official targets set for women’s
participation are no longer mentioned. Official emphasis on commercial agricultural production,
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particularly in the provincial departments of agriculture, coupled with difficulties in raising
‘own contributions’ and preparing ‘business plans’, ensures that most LRAD funding is going
to large-scale projects involving relatively small groups of better-off applicants. While this
may increase the ‘viability’ of projects, in terms of commercial production, it does little to
address the wider needs of poverty reduction, job creation and household food security.
The switch from SLAG to LRAD as the principal means of land redistribution was intended
to address a range of problems identified in the early years of the programme. The available
evidence, however, suggests that LRAD has not managed to overcome the problems associated
with SLAG and has effectively done away with the pro-poor elements of the previous programme.
SLAG was criticised for not attending to the post-transfer support needs of beneficiaries and
making a minimal contribution to improved rural livelihoods. After LRAD came into existence,
PDoAs gradually became active in agricultural extension support, training and infrastructural
support for beneficiaries. However, this process is still at an early stage and unevenly spread
across the country, and older SLAG projects still do not receive any support. Furthermore,
large group projects, encouraged by high land prices and other social factors, persist.
The supply of good quality agricultural land, in unit sizes and in areas suited to land reform
beneficiaries, remains a major challenge for the redistribution programme. Government officials
and landless people alike speak of the shortage of suitable land in many parts of the country.
Cumbersome bureaucratic processes associated with approval and release of redistribution
grants mean that would-be buyers often lose out when owners desire a quick sale on the open
market. On the other hand, many landowners speak of offering land for sale for redistribution
purposes and finding no buyers in their areas or enduring prolonged delays while grant
applications are being processed. Difficulties in obtaining land from private owners have been
exacerbated by the slow release of state-owned agricultural land and the ongoing practical
difficulties in subdividing large holdings.
The budget available for redistribution has increased only marginally in recent years, and is
not set to increase significantly in the years ahead. Expenditure of available budgets, however,
has increased dramatically, with recurring underspending now being superseded by severe
over-commitments in many provinces. Understaffing throughout the ranks of DLA is imposing
further constraints on the ability to meet the needs of land reform beneficiaries.
In common with other areas of land reform, the redistribution programme has been beset
by problems with monitoring and evaluation. Major inadequacies in the collection and
compilation of baseline statistics make it virtually impossible to know in any detail the socio-
economic profile of beneficiaries, the impact of land reform on livelihoods or the fate of projects
once they have been transferred.
Over the past three years there has been a noticeable growth in support for land redistribution
across much of civil society. There has also been an increased willingness on the part of NGOs,
commodity organisations and some landowners to become directly involved in the process. NGOs
and CBOs working in the rural sector remain critical of the general direction of land reform policy,
but have nevertheless proved themselves vital to the progress of numerous projects. Agricultural
commodity organisations, and many individual commercial farmers, have also made a significant
contribution, not only in terms of the provision of land but also in the form of mentoring and
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contract farming arrangements. While such partnerships bring multiple benefits, concerns
continue to be raised around share-equity schemes, heavily promoted in some provinces,
many of which do not appear to secure the long-term interests of farm workers and farm dwellers.
In order to meet the objectives of the land redistribution programme, and avoid an escalation
of rural conflict, a number of policy changes can be recommended, all within the current
constitutional framework. These can be divided into three broad categories – provision of land,
agrarian reform and budgets.4 It is not suggested that the state must take it upon itself to
provide all of these on its own, but there is an unavoidable duty on the state to use its
authority and resources to ensure that these things are achieved.
Provision of land
Provision of land on a large scale, within a reasonable time frame, will require a specific,
centrally coordinated strategy for land acquisition that goes beyond the limits of the willing-
buyer, willing-seller approach. Innovative ways will have to be found to facilitate the transfer
of substantial areas of land in places of highest demand and in parcels that meet the needs of
a variety of land users.
Large-scale transfers of land will require much greater involvement than hitherto by a
range of actors, including provincial and local government, landowners, NGOs and landless
people themselves. It will, above all, require a more interventionist approach by the state,
both in the acquisition of land and in the design of viable land-use projects. Such an
interventionist approach could involve the state earmarking land in areas of greatest need,
negotiating with local landowners for an orderly transfer of land, with appropriate compensation,
and acquiring repossessed properties from the Land Bank and other financial institutions.
This does not necessarily require expropriation, but the failure to consider the use of
expropriation to further the ends of redistribution perpetuates the current piecemeal approach
to land acquisition and rules out a coordinated approach to development and resettlement
that is so urgently needed.
Specific measures will also be required to provide land for particular categories of users,
such as residents of commercial farms and of small towns. Where necessary, the state must
also be prepared to subdivide acquired farms into appropriately sized parcels, something that
has not featured in policy to date. Finally, the state should reduce the highly complex processes
of beneficiary selection and project planning, as well as its insistence on commercially oriented
agriculture. Land should be made easily available to a wide range of users, including subsistence
producers, and not only to those able to come up with a ‘business plan’.
Agrarian reform
In order for land reform to result in sustainable livelihoods for the rural poor, provision of land
will have to be supported by a wide-ranging programme of agrarian reform. This should address
key areas such as access to inputs, restructuring of produce markets, agricultural extension
services and training, provision of transport and ploughing services, provision of credit,
development of rural infrastructure and support to farmers’ organisations and cooperatives.
Such a range of reforms cannot be brought about through the free market alone and will
therefore require a much greater degree of state intervention and investment in the economy
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than has been the case since 1994. Ways must also be found of pressuring the private sector
to redirect resources towards previously neglected areas and to empower farmers’ organisations
and emerging black entrepreneurs to run their own services. Such interventions must include
direct support to small farmers – in the form of subsidised credit and ploughing services – and
cannot be expected to leave the established structures of the broader agro-economy untouched.
Clearly, this will require a degree of political will, and a reversal of free-market ideology, not
currently in evidence.
Priority areas should be:
reversal of the recent cuts in agricultural extension services inside and outside the
former homelands
support to rural entrepreneurs wishing to provide mechanical services
access to irrigation water and infrastructure at below market rates (for at least a limited
period)
wider availability of credit at reduced interest rates
restructuring of input and output markets in order to meet the needs of small-scale
farmers in previously neglected areas.
International experience shows that the small-scale agricultural sector is closely linked to
the wider rural economy in terms of combining on-farm and off-farm employment, and in the
exchange of goods and services (Lipton 1996:14). Successful agrarian reform will therefore
require a substantial national programme of rural development, something that has been
entirely lacking in government policy to date.
Budgets
The current annual budget for the DLA is in the order of R1 billion, and the amount available
for land redistribution and tenure reform combined is approximately one-third of this. A trebling
of the DLA budget would amount to approximately one percent of the current non-interest
annual budget of the South African government. Such an amount could certainly be found
within the national budget and, over a period of perhaps ten years, could make an enormous
impact on the acquisition and transfer of land. Such an increase, however, would only make
sense if it is accompanied by those measures outlined above. Cutting the compensation paid to
landowners from market price to productive value, which would be possible within the current
constitutional framework, could substantially reduce the overall cost of redistributing land.
Overall, it may be said that, despite some successes, the South African land reform programme
has not to date lived up to its promise to transform land holding, combat poverty and revitalise
the rural economy. The policies adopted by government have left the structure of the rural
economy largely intact and, in the case of liberalisation of agricultural markets and cuts in
agricultural support services, have contributed to a climate that is not conducive to emerging,
resource-poor farmers. If land reform is to meet its wider objectives, new ways will have to be
found to transfer land on a substantial scale, and to provide the necessary support services to
a much wider class of landowners.
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Endnotes
1. The total land area of South Africa is approximately 122 million hectares (1.2 million square
kilometres). According to the Department of Agriculture (2001a), the total amount of land in
the commercial farming sector (outside the former homelands) in 2000 was 82 209 571
hectares, divided into 60 938 farming units. These figures do not include state-owned
agricultural land outside the former homelands, but such land amounts to less than 1% of
privately owned commercial farmland.
2. The Western Cape project list reported the own contributions for the four projects excluded
from Table 7 as ‘varied’.
3. Labour tenants are often being told to take out loans to acquire LRAD grants. This may,
however, jeopardise the land rights of those unable to repay their loans (Khubeka, pers.
comm.).
4. Based on Lahiff 2003.
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Appendix A: List of key informants
Ralph Damonse Business Plan Service Provider, Western Cape
Isaac Zwelinzima Dyantyi Delindlala Communal Property Association, Eastern Cape
Nosamkele Eleni Delindlala Communal Property Association, Eastern Cape
Lindinkosi D Fadana Regional Director, Amatole District, Eastern Cape PDoA
Terence Fife Director, Western Cape Land Reform Office
John Fortuin Director, Ubuntu Farmers’ Association, Malmesbury,
Western Cape
Ken George Land Bank, Pietermaritzburg, KwaZulu-Natal
Sharmla Govender Redistribution Implementation Systems Directorate, DLA
Joyene Isaacs Director, Farmer Settlement, Western Cape PDoA
Mike Kenyon Director, Eastern Cape Land Reform Office
Mangaliso Khubeka Tenure Security Coordinating Committee, KwaZulu-Natal
Lindsay Lotter Project Officer, Western Cape Land Reform Office
Anthony Louw Agricultural Extension Officer, Western Cape PDoA
Sue Middleton Deputy Director, Western Cape Land Reform Office
Vela Mngwengwe District Manager, Vryheid, KwaZulu-Natal Land Reform Office
Manye Moroka Director, Land Reform Implementation, DLA
M Mothobela Secretariat, National African Farmers’ Union
Fani Ncapayi Director, Calusa
George Oricho General Manager, Development Markets, Land Bank
Duncan Pringle Ithala Bank, Agri-Business Division
Nozolile Qayi Delindlala Communal Property Association, Eastern Cape
Deidre Rankin District Manager, South Coast, KwaZulu-Natal Land Reform
Office
Eric Ruhl Chairperson, Graceland CC (Western Cape)
Mduduzi Shabane Director, KwaZulu-Natal Land Reform Office
Floris Slabbert Deputy Director, Public Land Support Services, DLA
Monde Sukula Senior Planner, Eastern Cape Land Reform Office
Sipho Thabo Project Officer, Calusa
M J J Thupana Senior Manager, Farmer Settlement, Limpopo PDoA
William Urquhart Director, Farmer Settlement, KwaZulu-Natal PDoA
Ronnie Van den Heever Ithala Bank, Agri-Business Division
Carmen van der Merwe Redistribution Implementation Systems Directorate, DLA
Erica Williams Project Officer, Worcester District Land Reform Office
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Appendix B: Summary of legislation and policy
Legislation Key policies
Framework Constitution of the Republic of South White Paper on Land Policy (1997)
Africa Act 108 of 1996
Redistribution Provision of Land and Assistance Land Redistribution for Agricultural
Act 126 of 1993 Development (LRAD)
Provision of Certain Land for Settlement Commonage policy
 Amendment Act 26 of 1998
General Communal Property Associations Grants and services document,
Act 28 of 1996 Version 7 (June 2001)
Development Facilitation Act 67 Policy on expropriation in terms of
of 1995 Act 126 and ESTA
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